Democracy Now   March 18, 2016   Web Exclusive
In this web exclusive interview, New York Times reporter Scott Shane 
discusses his new book, "Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and 
the Rise of the Drone." It just won the 2016 Lionel Gelber Prize. The 
book tells the story of the first American deliberately killed in a 
drone strike, Anwar al-Awlaki, and examines why U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts since 9/11 seem to have backfired. 
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: This is 
Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, 
The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: We continue our conversation with Scott Shane, the national security reporter for 
The New York Times. His new book is called 
Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone.
 It just won the 2016 Lionel Gelber Prize. The book tells the story of 
the first American deliberately killed in a drone strike, Anwar 
al-Awlaki, and examines why U.S. counterterrorism efforts since 9/11 
seem to have backfired.
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Shane, why don’t you start off with the title of the book, 
Objective Troy?
SCOTT SHANE:
 Yeah. If you are added to the kill list, the list of suspected 
terrorists that, in the Obama administration, have been targeted for 
killing in drone strikes, the military calls you an "objective" and 
gives you a codename. And in Anwar al-Awlaki’s case, he was given the 
name "Objective Troy." You know, at first I wondered if that was some 
reference to the Trojan horse or something literary or symbolic, but it 
turns out that they gave the people targeted in Yemen the names of Ohio 
towns. So Anwar al-Awlaki became Objective Troy because of Troy, Ohio, 
small town in Ohio.
AMY GOODMAN: And talk about what this program was, what the Obama administration did and the whole thesis of, well, the subtitle, 
A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone.
SCOTT SHANE:
 Well, you know, I wanted to take a look at both sides of the kind of 
problem that has dominated U.S. foreign policy for 15 years, and that is
 the threat of terrorism and what the U.S.’s response has been. And the 
story of Anwar al-Awlaki sort of captures both sides of this, because, 
on the one hand, he was an American who spent about half of his 40 years
 in the U.S., had a quite happy life here, had a very successful career 
as an imam here, denounced 9/11, called for bridge building after 9/11, 
and yet he ended up with al-Qaeda in his last years plotting attacks on 
the U.S. So I wanted to sort of understand that trajectory and what made
 him take that course.
And on the other side, I guess, as a reporter, I’ve been struck by 
the fact that just about everything the U.S. has done against the 
terrorist threat or in connection with the terrorist threat since 9/11, 
whatever its contribution to the U.S. security, has also generated this 
sort of backlash that has played into the hands of al-Qaeda and, more 
recently, 
ISIS. So, you know, I’m talking 
about the CIA’s black sites, interrogation and torture at Guantánamo, 
the prison at Guantámao Bay, and, you know, especially under Obama, the 
drone strikes. You know, all of these things have become sort of 
recruiting tools for al-Qaeda and 
ISIS, proof 
that—you know, for those groups, that the U.S. is at war with Islam, as 
they say, and therefore, you know, a generator of recruits for the very 
groups that the U.S. is trying to fight.
And Awlaki’s case also provided insight into that. You know, he was 
killed in 2011. It took them almost a year and a half to find him. In 
Yemen, you know, a drone found him. He was killed along with another 
American acolyte, Samir Khan, and two Yemeni guys from al-Qaeda. And I 
think, at the time, the Obama administration saw this as a real victory,
 a sort of feather in their cap. A few months earlier, they had caught 
and killed Osama bin Laden. But in retrospect, while Anwar al-Awlaki was
 removed as an operational terrorist—he wasn’t going to actually 
participate, obviously, in any more terrorist plots—he was a guy whose 
greatest importance was as the most effective ideologue, propagandist 
recruiter for al-Qaeda, in English, you know, in its history. And he has
 lived on on the Internet. I went on YouTube yesterday and put his name 
into the search engine, and you come up with 67,000 videos, most of 
which are his life’s work, from the early days when he put out 
mainstream boxes of CDs, 53 CDs on the life of the Prophet Muhammad, all
 the way through to the al-Qaeda stuff at the end of his life, when he 
was instructing Muslims in the West and in the United States that it was
 their religious obligation to stage attacks. And it’s all there, and it
 remains very powerful, very influential, more than four years after his
 death. And not only that, but by killing him, the U.S. government 
inadvertently promoted him to martyrdom in the eyes of his fans. So if 
you go on YouTube, you find that they have posted and reposted his 
videos with tributes to Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, the great martyr. So he 
speaks from beyond the grave with even more authority and influence than
 when he was alive.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Well, let’s go back to Anwar al-Awlaki in November 2001. He spoke to 
The Washington Post then about the significance of Ramadan.
ANWAR AL-AWLAKI:
 Ramadan is a chance for us to get away from the worldly indulgence in 
everything that is material. It’s a chance for us to have a more austere
 life. I think that, in general, Islam is presented in a—in a negative 
way. I mean, there’s always this association between Islam and 
terrorism, when that is not true at all. I mean, Islam is a religion of 
peace.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Well, less than 10 years later, Anwar al-Awlaki released this al-Qaeda video, "A Call to Jihad."
ANWAR AL-AWLAKI:
 Do not be deceived by the promises of preserving your rights from a 
government that is right now killing your own brothers and sisters. 
Today, with the war between Muslims and the West escalating, you cannot 
count on the message of solidarity you may get from a civic group or a 
political party, or the word of support you hear from a kind neighbor or
 a nice co-worker. The West will eventually turn against its Muslim 
citizens. Hence my advice to you is this. You have two choices: either 
hijra or jihad. You either leave or you fight.
NERMEEN SHAIKH:
 That’s Anwar al-Awlaki. So, Scott Shane, can you talk about his 
transformation and how he came to work with al-Qaeda? And also, that 
video, where was it recorded?
SCOTT SHANE: Well, the first video was recorded by 
The Washington Post
 when—at a time right after 9/11, when the media in Washington 
discovered that there was this young, charismatic imam who spoke native 
English and native Arabic and was available to explain Islam to 
Americans, who suddenly had a great interest in this topic. And, you 
know, he was suddenly in 
The New York Times and 
The Washington Post.
 He was on TV, he was on the radio. And he—you know, he was sort of on a
 trajectory to become a major public figure in the U.S. He was well on 
his way—
AMY GOODMAN: I mean, he was invited to the Pentagon, right?
SCOTT SHANE:
 He spoke—he was a luncheon speaker at the Pentagon. He preached at the 
Capitol. And, you know, looking back, I have often thought that he might
 have been a national voice for American Muslims in the last 15 years, a
 voice that has not really existed at the highest level, sort of on the 
Sunday TV shows and that kind of thing. He was certainly capable of 
that. And I think that was where he was headed. But some personal things
 and some external sort of world developments intervened.
The first personal thing that happened was he discovered—he was 
actually planning—he was very happy in the U.S. He was planning to stay 
and keep his career going. The 
FBI, which had 
looked into him after 9/11, had concluded he had no ties to al-Qaeda and
 no ties to the 9/11 plot, even though a few of the hijackers had prayed
 at his mosques, and so they were worried about that, but they had 
essentially cleared him. But what he found out was that in the process 
of following him around to see if he had any ties to al-Qaeda, they had 
discovered that he had the habit of visiting prostitutes in Washington 
hotels on a regular basis. And one of the managers of one of these 
escort services that he had been using called him out—called him up and 
told him the 
FBI knew all about these visits. 
And he panicked. And he—you know, he was a conservative preacher with a 
conservative congregation, and he just could not stand the idea that he 
would be exposed as a hypocrite before the world. And he flew off to the
 U.K. and abandoned his career in the U.S. And so, we had this guy with a
 lot of talent and a lot of ambition, and he was sort of in play at this
 point, and he was looking for a new place to take his career.
And the other thing that happened, while he was in the U.K. preaching
 and taking an increasingly radical line, although it was always shaped 
at that point in terms of Islamic history and sort of the history of 
jihad in Muhammad’s—in the Prophet Muhammad’s time—but the other thing 
that happened, of course, was the U.S. had invaded Afghanistan, which 
Anwar al-Awlaki denounced, but in a fairly modest way, mild way. But 
when the U.S. invaded Iraq, that had a huge impact on him. And, you 
know, I think he began to think about what bin Laden had already said, 
which was that there was a war between the U.S. and Islam, and you had 
to take sides.
And eventually he ended up in Yemen. He was in prison for a year and a
 half without charges, in part with the encouragement of the United 
States, which was worried about his influence as a radicalizer. And when
 he got out of prison, not long after that, he moved to the tribal 
territories in Yemen and hooked up with al-Qaeda. And so, when he made 
that second video, he was, you know, a quite influential member of 
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and he was a part of a small cell 
within that group that was focused, not as the bulk of the group was on 
the Yemeni government and the Saudi monarchy, but on the so-called far 
enemy, as al-Qaeda called it, the United States. So he played a 
significant role in organizing the underwear bomb attack on Christmas 
Day in 2009, as folks will remember, when a young Nigerian tried to blow
 up a plane over Detroit. He played a role in sending two bombs in 
printer ink cartridges aboard cargo planes addressed to Chicago, clearly
 chosen because of the association with Obama.
So, you know, you had this peculiar situation where Obama had given 
the kill order, and the American drones were looking for Awlaki, to send
 a missile his way in Yemen. And he was, in effect, sending, you know, 
airplanes back at the U.S. loaded with bombs. But actually, the plots he
 was involved in all failed. And as I mentioned, he was killed at the 
end of September in 2011.
NERMEEN SHAIKH:
 Well, Scott Shane, could you talk about the 2010 legal opinion, which 
made it, in fact, legal and constitutional to kill Anwar al-Awlaki? You 
write in 
Objective Troy, "Before 9/11, anyone proposing to use 
missiles in a country where we were not at war to kill suspected 
terrorists week after week would have been met with strong opposition." 
So could you tell us about the people who wrote this opinion, David 
Barron and Marty Lederman?
SCOTT SHANE:
 Yeah. I mean, what is sort of striking about the drone program, in 
general, is the, in my opinion, excessive secrecy that has been attached
 to it. So, it took years before there was any congressional debate. We 
still don’t know what the government itself thinks is the record of the 
drone program. And it took us—I filed a 
FOIA, a
 Freedom of Information, request in 2010 for all the Justice Department 
legal opinions on targeted killing, and it took a long court fight 
before an appeals court gave us—ordered the government to release 
redacted copies of two legal opinions that justified the killing of 
Anwar al-Awlaki. So, you know, there’s been a great deal of secrecy even
 around the legal opinions that the government—in which the government 
explains why it believes these actions are legal and constitutional.
But in this particular instance, after the evidence emerged 
connecting Anwar al-Awlaki to the underwear bomb plot in December of 
2009, President Obama essentially asked the Justice Department to take a
 look at whether it would be legal and constitutional for him to give 
the order to kill this guy, because he was an American citizen. And, you
 know, on the face of it, the Constitution makes it impermissible to 
deprive someone of life or liberty without due process of law. So, Marty
 Lederman and David Barron were both sort of liberal legal academics who
 had been highly critical of the Bush administration and its approach to
 counterterrorism. So, they suddenly found themselves with the job of, 
in great secrecy, deciding whether it was legal to target and kill Anwar
 al-Awlaki. And they concluded that it was, and gave the word to the 
White House. And the White House approved—the president approved on 
February 5th, 2010, the legality of killing this guy. That was based on 
one legal opinion, which they completed in written form in February.
Then, out in the world, it had been leaked that Anwar al-Awlaki was 
on the kill list, and some legal scholars, you know, criticized this 
decision. And they came up with another legal opinion in July of 2010 
sort of plugging the holes that people had poked in this argument. But, 
you know, what’s interesting is, for my book, with the help of a friend 
who teaches constitutional law, I organized a sort of unofficial, 
informal poll of people who had taught or do teach constitutional law, 
professors of constitutional law. And of about three dozen, I asked them
 only the question: "Was it legal and constitutional for the U.S. 
government to kill Anwar al-Awlaki?" And the answers came back very 
divided. About a third said, yes, it was. About a third said, no, it was
 not. And about a third said it depended on the details. So, this is far
 from a settled question—
AMY GOODMAN: And what does it mean if it’s not, Scott?
SCOTT SHANE: —certainly in the scholarly community.
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Shane, what does it mean, if it’s not?
SCOTT SHANE:
 Well, it means that this—that this act, certainly in the opinions of 
the critics, that it violated the Fifth Amendment and maybe the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution. And some would also argue that it 
violates some statutes, including one called the foreign-murder statute.
 And so, you know, how this will play out in future administrations, 
we’ll have to see. But the precedent has been set.
AMY GOODMAN: So then, it could be that President Obama, if it was found not to be legal, could be brought up on war crimes.
SCOTT SHANE:
 I think that’s highly unlikely, because it’s hard to imagine, you know,
 how this ever comes before a court. Anwar al-Awlaki’s father Nasser, 
the former agriculture minister and chancellor of universities in Yemen,
 twice went to U.S. court. He felt—he was a big fan of America, had 
spent a dozen years living here, and he felt that he wanted to hold the 
U.S. to what he saw as its principles, which he had always admired. And 
so, he went to court twice, first to get his son off the kill list and 
then to force the government to sort of present the evidence on which—on
 the basis of which it had killed his son and, actually, his grandson, 
who had been killed in a second drone strike. And both those cases were 
dismissed. And so, you know, this question, as has happened often since 
9/11, you know, a major question that you would hope and think that 
American courts would sort of weigh in on, has not actually found a way 
to come before the justice system.
AMY GOODMAN:
 And that point you just made about—and then his son was killed. I mean,
 two weeks later, a 16-year-old boy, right, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, who 
went out to find his father in the desert, who’s sitting at an outdoor 
cafe, is then killed in a drone strike, born in Denver, Colorado. What 
is the explanation of this?
SCOTT SHANE:
 I mean, the explanation that I heard repeatedly from people inside the 
government was that this was a tragic and colossal screw-up. You know, 
the claim is—and I believe this—that they had no idea who they were 
shooting at, which unfortunately has happened too often in the drone 
war. They believed that they were shooting at a kind of mid-level 
al-Qaeda guy, an Egyptian named Ibrahim al-Banna. He turned out not to 
be there. There is some evidence that some of the people—some of the 
seven men killed in that strike were affiliated with al-Qaeda, but two 
of the others there were 16-year-old son of Anwar al-Awlaki and his 
17-year-old cousin.
Abdulrahman, who by all accounts was a very sweet kid, a great kid 
with no history of any association with radicalism or terrorism, as you 
say, he had left home. He was living with his grandparents. He had left 
home to find his father. And this was after—you know, everybody 
remembers the spring of 2011 and a lot of young people coming out onto 
the central squares in Arab capitals, including in Sana’a, the capital 
of Yemen. And young Abdulrahman had been part of that and had sort of 
had a political awakening. And I think that led to his desire to find 
his father, talk to his father about all these big issues. You know, his
 father was, by then, essentially a notorious member of al-Qaeda. He did
 not find his father, but while he was looking for him, he got word that
 his father had been killed in an American drone strike in another part 
of Yemen. There is evidence that at that point this 16-year-old kid, you
 know, said, "That does it, I’m joining the jihad," and that that may be
 one reason why he was with al-Qaeda figures when he was killed.
But it remains also the case that he was not on any American kill 
list and that Obama was reportedly furious when he heard that this had 
happened, because he understood that while a lot of Yemenis understood 
the death of Anwar al-Awlaki—I mean, he was seen as trying to kill 
Americans, and the Americans got to him first, and Yemen is a tribal 
land where people kind of understand that. The death of the 16-year-old 
made a huge impression. And when I was reporting for the book in 2014 in
 Yemen, you know, I found that that was still something that caused huge
 outrage and grief and remained a kind of stain on the American 
reputation in Yemen, and certainly had played into the hands of al-Qaeda
 there.
NERMEEN SHAIKH:
 Well, people in the Obama administration, including Obama himself, have
 in fact justified the use of drones and targeted killings by saying 
that it vastly diminishes the number of civilian casualties, or what’s 
referred to as collateral damage. What do you make of that?
SCOTT SHANE:
 Well, certainly, in the history of warfare, if you take a long view and
 you look back at World War I or World War II and the firebombing of 
Tokyo and of Dresden, let alone the atomic bombs, if you even look at 
Vietnam, you know, with the Americans dropping huge tonnage of bombs on 
Vietnamese villages, I mean, the killing in those wars was incomparably 
greater than in the drone program. And I think what drew Obama to the 
drone was the idea that you would fit the weapon to the target. He 
thought the big wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had been, you know, 
essentially failures, disasters, had not really contributed to making 
the U.S. safer from terrorism and had these colossal civilian casualties
 and casualties for American troops, civilian casualties in the hundreds
 of thousands. So, he thought, if a drone could kill three terrorists, 
five terrorists, you know, that would—without turning a country upside 
down, that would make a lot of sense.
I don’t think he has given up on that belief. He’s said to believe 
that, you know, real attacks on the West had been averted by drone 
strikes. But I think the administration has also learned that it’s 
impossible to get perfect intelligence to tell who’s who on the ground 
thousands of miles away. And so that these drone strikes have, in some 
cases, [inaudible] maybe as many of—you know, of 10 or 20 percent of the
 people killed have been innocents. And that’s produced a huge backlash.
 And the question of sort of the invasion of other countries’ 
sovereignty has produced a big political backlash in Yemen and Pakistan.
 So, you know, sort of the bottom line on this program remains to be, 
you know, judged. What is clear is I’m told that there are now six 
countries that have used armed drones. You know, the example the U.S. 
has set is being copied around the world. And I don’t think this weapon 
is going to go away. So the path that the U.S. has sort of pioneered is 
going to play out, and we’ll see what the consequences are.
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Shane, we don’t have much time, but I wanted to ask about another thread through 
Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone,
 in this parallel in the lives of Anwar al-Awlaki and President Obama in
 how they grew up, their family backgrounds. Can you talk about this and
 the different paths they took?
SCOTT SHANE:
 Yeah. I mean, I don’t think—I don’t want to make too much of this. 
It’s, in a way, a somewhat random observation. But it is remarkable that
 both Barack Obama and Anwar al-Awlaki were born in the U.S. to fathers 
of Muslim background who had come to the United States to study as 
graduate students. Both of them then were taken by their families 
overseas to Muslim countries, and then they came back to the U.S. Barack
 Obama, of course, went to Indonesia and came back with his mother. 
Anwar al-Awlaki came back to go to—was sent back by his father from 
Yemen to attend college at Colorado State.
And interestingly, this caused them both, I think it’s fair to say, 
some confusion about identity, some sort of identity crisis, which Obama
 has famously described in his book, 
Dreams from My Father. And
 Obama actually talks in that book about the temptation of radicalism, 
of militancy, that he felt as a young man, as a young black man in 
America, with this very colorful and sort of mixed-up background. Anwar 
al-Awlaki clearly also, ultimately, felt the temptation of radicalism 
and ended up taking, you know, a very different path from Barack Obama. 
But it’s sort of fascinating. President Obama wouldn’t talk to me for 
this book, but maybe after he’s out of office, I would love to sit down 
with him and talk to him about how he sees all of this.
AMY GOODMAN: And what most surprised you in writing this book, in writing 
Objective Troy?
SCOTT SHANE:
 You know, I guess what struck me was—and I guess this is true of all of
 our lives, but the sort of random twists and turns that have such a 
profound effect on an individual life and sometimes on the course of 
history. I think if that escort service manager had not called Anwar 
al-Awlaki and sent him on the path that ended with al-Qaeda in Yemen, we
 might be as tired of seeing Anwar al-Awlaki on 
Meet the Press as some people are of seeing Senator McCain on 
Meet the Press,
 and he might be, you know, a sort of prominent American political voice
 and perhaps a useful voice, given the events of the last 15 years. So, 
you know, it just struck me in a way how contingent life is, how random 
life is and how very small events can have profound outcomes.
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Shane, we want to thank you so much for being with us. Scott Shane is national security reporter for 
The New York Times. Along with Jo Becker, he recently wrote a two-part series [
part one, 
part two] in the 
Times, "The Libya Gamble," but he’s also author of the brand new book, 
Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone. The book just won the 2016 Lionel Gelber Prize. This is 
Democracy Now! I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh. Thanks for joining us.