Democracy Now March 18, 2016 Web Exclusive
In this web exclusive interview, New York Times reporter Scott Shane
discusses his new book, "Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and
the Rise of the Drone." It just won the 2016 Lionel Gelber Prize. The
book tells the story of the first American deliberately killed in a
drone strike, Anwar al-Awlaki, and examines why U.S. counterterrorism
efforts since 9/11 seem to have backfired.
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: This is
Democracy Now!, democracynow.org,
The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: We continue our conversation with Scott Shane, the national security reporter for
The New York Times. His new book is called
Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone.
It just won the 2016 Lionel Gelber Prize. The book tells the story of
the first American deliberately killed in a drone strike, Anwar
al-Awlaki, and examines why U.S. counterterrorism efforts since 9/11
seem to have backfired.
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Shane, why don’t you start off with the title of the book,
Objective Troy?
SCOTT SHANE:
Yeah. If you are added to the kill list, the list of suspected
terrorists that, in the Obama administration, have been targeted for
killing in drone strikes, the military calls you an "objective" and
gives you a codename. And in Anwar al-Awlaki’s case, he was given the
name "Objective Troy." You know, at first I wondered if that was some
reference to the Trojan horse or something literary or symbolic, but it
turns out that they gave the people targeted in Yemen the names of Ohio
towns. So Anwar al-Awlaki became Objective Troy because of Troy, Ohio,
small town in Ohio.
AMY GOODMAN: And talk about what this program was, what the Obama administration did and the whole thesis of, well, the subtitle,
A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone.
SCOTT SHANE:
Well, you know, I wanted to take a look at both sides of the kind of
problem that has dominated U.S. foreign policy for 15 years, and that is
the threat of terrorism and what the U.S.’s response has been. And the
story of Anwar al-Awlaki sort of captures both sides of this, because,
on the one hand, he was an American who spent about half of his 40 years
in the U.S., had a quite happy life here, had a very successful career
as an imam here, denounced 9/11, called for bridge building after 9/11,
and yet he ended up with al-Qaeda in his last years plotting attacks on
the U.S. So I wanted to sort of understand that trajectory and what made
him take that course.
And on the other side, I guess, as a reporter, I’ve been struck by
the fact that just about everything the U.S. has done against the
terrorist threat or in connection with the terrorist threat since 9/11,
whatever its contribution to the U.S. security, has also generated this
sort of backlash that has played into the hands of al-Qaeda and, more
recently,
ISIS. So, you know, I’m talking
about the CIA’s black sites, interrogation and torture at Guantánamo,
the prison at Guantámao Bay, and, you know, especially under Obama, the
drone strikes. You know, all of these things have become sort of
recruiting tools for al-Qaeda and
ISIS, proof
that—you know, for those groups, that the U.S. is at war with Islam, as
they say, and therefore, you know, a generator of recruits for the very
groups that the U.S. is trying to fight.
And Awlaki’s case also provided insight into that. You know, he was
killed in 2011. It took them almost a year and a half to find him. In
Yemen, you know, a drone found him. He was killed along with another
American acolyte, Samir Khan, and two Yemeni guys from al-Qaeda. And I
think, at the time, the Obama administration saw this as a real victory,
a sort of feather in their cap. A few months earlier, they had caught
and killed Osama bin Laden. But in retrospect, while Anwar al-Awlaki was
removed as an operational terrorist—he wasn’t going to actually
participate, obviously, in any more terrorist plots—he was a guy whose
greatest importance was as the most effective ideologue, propagandist
recruiter for al-Qaeda, in English, you know, in its history. And he has
lived on on the Internet. I went on YouTube yesterday and put his name
into the search engine, and you come up with 67,000 videos, most of
which are his life’s work, from the early days when he put out
mainstream boxes of CDs, 53 CDs on the life of the Prophet Muhammad, all
the way through to the al-Qaeda stuff at the end of his life, when he
was instructing Muslims in the West and in the United States that it was
their religious obligation to stage attacks. And it’s all there, and it
remains very powerful, very influential, more than four years after his
death. And not only that, but by killing him, the U.S. government
inadvertently promoted him to martyrdom in the eyes of his fans. So if
you go on YouTube, you find that they have posted and reposted his
videos with tributes to Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, the great martyr. So he
speaks from beyond the grave with even more authority and influence than
when he was alive.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Well, let’s go back to Anwar al-Awlaki in November 2001. He spoke to
The Washington Post then about the significance of Ramadan.
ANWAR AL-AWLAKI:
Ramadan is a chance for us to get away from the worldly indulgence in
everything that is material. It’s a chance for us to have a more austere
life. I think that, in general, Islam is presented in a—in a negative
way. I mean, there’s always this association between Islam and
terrorism, when that is not true at all. I mean, Islam is a religion of
peace.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Well, less than 10 years later, Anwar al-Awlaki released this al-Qaeda video, "A Call to Jihad."
ANWAR AL-AWLAKI:
Do not be deceived by the promises of preserving your rights from a
government that is right now killing your own brothers and sisters.
Today, with the war between Muslims and the West escalating, you cannot
count on the message of solidarity you may get from a civic group or a
political party, or the word of support you hear from a kind neighbor or
a nice co-worker. The West will eventually turn against its Muslim
citizens. Hence my advice to you is this. You have two choices: either
hijra or jihad. You either leave or you fight.
NERMEEN SHAIKH:
That’s Anwar al-Awlaki. So, Scott Shane, can you talk about his
transformation and how he came to work with al-Qaeda? And also, that
video, where was it recorded?
SCOTT SHANE: Well, the first video was recorded by
The Washington Post
when—at a time right after 9/11, when the media in Washington
discovered that there was this young, charismatic imam who spoke native
English and native Arabic and was available to explain Islam to
Americans, who suddenly had a great interest in this topic. And, you
know, he was suddenly in
The New York Times and
The Washington Post.
He was on TV, he was on the radio. And he—you know, he was sort of on a
trajectory to become a major public figure in the U.S. He was well on
his way—
AMY GOODMAN: I mean, he was invited to the Pentagon, right?
SCOTT SHANE:
He spoke—he was a luncheon speaker at the Pentagon. He preached at the
Capitol. And, you know, looking back, I have often thought that he might
have been a national voice for American Muslims in the last 15 years, a
voice that has not really existed at the highest level, sort of on the
Sunday TV shows and that kind of thing. He was certainly capable of
that. And I think that was where he was headed. But some personal things
and some external sort of world developments intervened.
The first personal thing that happened was he discovered—he was
actually planning—he was very happy in the U.S. He was planning to stay
and keep his career going. The
FBI, which had
looked into him after 9/11, had concluded he had no ties to al-Qaeda and
no ties to the 9/11 plot, even though a few of the hijackers had prayed
at his mosques, and so they were worried about that, but they had
essentially cleared him. But what he found out was that in the process
of following him around to see if he had any ties to al-Qaeda, they had
discovered that he had the habit of visiting prostitutes in Washington
hotels on a regular basis. And one of the managers of one of these
escort services that he had been using called him out—called him up and
told him the
FBI knew all about these visits.
And he panicked. And he—you know, he was a conservative preacher with a
conservative congregation, and he just could not stand the idea that he
would be exposed as a hypocrite before the world. And he flew off to the
U.K. and abandoned his career in the U.S. And so, we had this guy with a
lot of talent and a lot of ambition, and he was sort of in play at this
point, and he was looking for a new place to take his career.
And the other thing that happened, while he was in the U.K. preaching
and taking an increasingly radical line, although it was always shaped
at that point in terms of Islamic history and sort of the history of
jihad in Muhammad’s—in the Prophet Muhammad’s time—but the other thing
that happened, of course, was the U.S. had invaded Afghanistan, which
Anwar al-Awlaki denounced, but in a fairly modest way, mild way. But
when the U.S. invaded Iraq, that had a huge impact on him. And, you
know, I think he began to think about what bin Laden had already said,
which was that there was a war between the U.S. and Islam, and you had
to take sides.
And eventually he ended up in Yemen. He was in prison for a year and a
half without charges, in part with the encouragement of the United
States, which was worried about his influence as a radicalizer. And when
he got out of prison, not long after that, he moved to the tribal
territories in Yemen and hooked up with al-Qaeda. And so, when he made
that second video, he was, you know, a quite influential member of
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and he was a part of a small cell
within that group that was focused, not as the bulk of the group was on
the Yemeni government and the Saudi monarchy, but on the so-called far
enemy, as al-Qaeda called it, the United States. So he played a
significant role in organizing the underwear bomb attack on Christmas
Day in 2009, as folks will remember, when a young Nigerian tried to blow
up a plane over Detroit. He played a role in sending two bombs in
printer ink cartridges aboard cargo planes addressed to Chicago, clearly
chosen because of the association with Obama.
So, you know, you had this peculiar situation where Obama had given
the kill order, and the American drones were looking for Awlaki, to send
a missile his way in Yemen. And he was, in effect, sending, you know,
airplanes back at the U.S. loaded with bombs. But actually, the plots he
was involved in all failed. And as I mentioned, he was killed at the
end of September in 2011.
NERMEEN SHAIKH:
Well, Scott Shane, could you talk about the 2010 legal opinion, which
made it, in fact, legal and constitutional to kill Anwar al-Awlaki? You
write in
Objective Troy, "Before 9/11, anyone proposing to use
missiles in a country where we were not at war to kill suspected
terrorists week after week would have been met with strong opposition."
So could you tell us about the people who wrote this opinion, David
Barron and Marty Lederman?
SCOTT SHANE:
Yeah. I mean, what is sort of striking about the drone program, in
general, is the, in my opinion, excessive secrecy that has been attached
to it. So, it took years before there was any congressional debate. We
still don’t know what the government itself thinks is the record of the
drone program. And it took us—I filed a
FOIA, a
Freedom of Information, request in 2010 for all the Justice Department
legal opinions on targeted killing, and it took a long court fight
before an appeals court gave us—ordered the government to release
redacted copies of two legal opinions that justified the killing of
Anwar al-Awlaki. So, you know, there’s been a great deal of secrecy even
around the legal opinions that the government—in which the government
explains why it believes these actions are legal and constitutional.
But in this particular instance, after the evidence emerged
connecting Anwar al-Awlaki to the underwear bomb plot in December of
2009, President Obama essentially asked the Justice Department to take a
look at whether it would be legal and constitutional for him to give
the order to kill this guy, because he was an American citizen. And, you
know, on the face of it, the Constitution makes it impermissible to
deprive someone of life or liberty without due process of law. So, Marty
Lederman and David Barron were both sort of liberal legal academics who
had been highly critical of the Bush administration and its approach to
counterterrorism. So, they suddenly found themselves with the job of,
in great secrecy, deciding whether it was legal to target and kill Anwar
al-Awlaki. And they concluded that it was, and gave the word to the
White House. And the White House approved—the president approved on
February 5th, 2010, the legality of killing this guy. That was based on
one legal opinion, which they completed in written form in February.
Then, out in the world, it had been leaked that Anwar al-Awlaki was
on the kill list, and some legal scholars, you know, criticized this
decision. And they came up with another legal opinion in July of 2010
sort of plugging the holes that people had poked in this argument. But,
you know, what’s interesting is, for my book, with the help of a friend
who teaches constitutional law, I organized a sort of unofficial,
informal poll of people who had taught or do teach constitutional law,
professors of constitutional law. And of about three dozen, I asked them
only the question: "Was it legal and constitutional for the U.S.
government to kill Anwar al-Awlaki?" And the answers came back very
divided. About a third said, yes, it was. About a third said, no, it was
not. And about a third said it depended on the details. So, this is far
from a settled question—
AMY GOODMAN: And what does it mean if it’s not, Scott?
SCOTT SHANE: —certainly in the scholarly community.
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Shane, what does it mean, if it’s not?
SCOTT SHANE:
Well, it means that this—that this act, certainly in the opinions of
the critics, that it violated the Fifth Amendment and maybe the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution. And some would also argue that it
violates some statutes, including one called the foreign-murder statute.
And so, you know, how this will play out in future administrations,
we’ll have to see. But the precedent has been set.
AMY GOODMAN: So then, it could be that President Obama, if it was found not to be legal, could be brought up on war crimes.
SCOTT SHANE:
I think that’s highly unlikely, because it’s hard to imagine, you know,
how this ever comes before a court. Anwar al-Awlaki’s father Nasser,
the former agriculture minister and chancellor of universities in Yemen,
twice went to U.S. court. He felt—he was a big fan of America, had
spent a dozen years living here, and he felt that he wanted to hold the
U.S. to what he saw as its principles, which he had always admired. And
so, he went to court twice, first to get his son off the kill list and
then to force the government to sort of present the evidence on which—on
the basis of which it had killed his son and, actually, his grandson,
who had been killed in a second drone strike. And both those cases were
dismissed. And so, you know, this question, as has happened often since
9/11, you know, a major question that you would hope and think that
American courts would sort of weigh in on, has not actually found a way
to come before the justice system.
AMY GOODMAN:
And that point you just made about—and then his son was killed. I mean,
two weeks later, a 16-year-old boy, right, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, who
went out to find his father in the desert, who’s sitting at an outdoor
cafe, is then killed in a drone strike, born in Denver, Colorado. What
is the explanation of this?
SCOTT SHANE:
I mean, the explanation that I heard repeatedly from people inside the
government was that this was a tragic and colossal screw-up. You know,
the claim is—and I believe this—that they had no idea who they were
shooting at, which unfortunately has happened too often in the drone
war. They believed that they were shooting at a kind of mid-level
al-Qaeda guy, an Egyptian named Ibrahim al-Banna. He turned out not to
be there. There is some evidence that some of the people—some of the
seven men killed in that strike were affiliated with al-Qaeda, but two
of the others there were 16-year-old son of Anwar al-Awlaki and his
17-year-old cousin.
Abdulrahman, who by all accounts was a very sweet kid, a great kid
with no history of any association with radicalism or terrorism, as you
say, he had left home. He was living with his grandparents. He had left
home to find his father. And this was after—you know, everybody
remembers the spring of 2011 and a lot of young people coming out onto
the central squares in Arab capitals, including in Sana’a, the capital
of Yemen. And young Abdulrahman had been part of that and had sort of
had a political awakening. And I think that led to his desire to find
his father, talk to his father about all these big issues. You know, his
father was, by then, essentially a notorious member of al-Qaeda. He did
not find his father, but while he was looking for him, he got word that
his father had been killed in an American drone strike in another part
of Yemen. There is evidence that at that point this 16-year-old kid, you
know, said, "That does it, I’m joining the jihad," and that that may be
one reason why he was with al-Qaeda figures when he was killed.
But it remains also the case that he was not on any American kill
list and that Obama was reportedly furious when he heard that this had
happened, because he understood that while a lot of Yemenis understood
the death of Anwar al-Awlaki—I mean, he was seen as trying to kill
Americans, and the Americans got to him first, and Yemen is a tribal
land where people kind of understand that. The death of the 16-year-old
made a huge impression. And when I was reporting for the book in 2014 in
Yemen, you know, I found that that was still something that caused huge
outrage and grief and remained a kind of stain on the American
reputation in Yemen, and certainly had played into the hands of al-Qaeda
there.
NERMEEN SHAIKH:
Well, people in the Obama administration, including Obama himself, have
in fact justified the use of drones and targeted killings by saying
that it vastly diminishes the number of civilian casualties, or what’s
referred to as collateral damage. What do you make of that?
SCOTT SHANE:
Well, certainly, in the history of warfare, if you take a long view and
you look back at World War I or World War II and the firebombing of
Tokyo and of Dresden, let alone the atomic bombs, if you even look at
Vietnam, you know, with the Americans dropping huge tonnage of bombs on
Vietnamese villages, I mean, the killing in those wars was incomparably
greater than in the drone program. And I think what drew Obama to the
drone was the idea that you would fit the weapon to the target. He
thought the big wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had been, you know,
essentially failures, disasters, had not really contributed to making
the U.S. safer from terrorism and had these colossal civilian casualties
and casualties for American troops, civilian casualties in the hundreds
of thousands. So, he thought, if a drone could kill three terrorists,
five terrorists, you know, that would—without turning a country upside
down, that would make a lot of sense.
I don’t think he has given up on that belief. He’s said to believe
that, you know, real attacks on the West had been averted by drone
strikes. But I think the administration has also learned that it’s
impossible to get perfect intelligence to tell who’s who on the ground
thousands of miles away. And so that these drone strikes have, in some
cases, [inaudible] maybe as many of—you know, of 10 or 20 percent of the
people killed have been innocents. And that’s produced a huge backlash.
And the question of sort of the invasion of other countries’
sovereignty has produced a big political backlash in Yemen and Pakistan.
So, you know, sort of the bottom line on this program remains to be,
you know, judged. What is clear is I’m told that there are now six
countries that have used armed drones. You know, the example the U.S.
has set is being copied around the world. And I don’t think this weapon
is going to go away. So the path that the U.S. has sort of pioneered is
going to play out, and we’ll see what the consequences are.
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Shane, we don’t have much time, but I wanted to ask about another thread through
Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone,
in this parallel in the lives of Anwar al-Awlaki and President Obama in
how they grew up, their family backgrounds. Can you talk about this and
the different paths they took?
SCOTT SHANE:
Yeah. I mean, I don’t think—I don’t want to make too much of this.
It’s, in a way, a somewhat random observation. But it is remarkable that
both Barack Obama and Anwar al-Awlaki were born in the U.S. to fathers
of Muslim background who had come to the United States to study as
graduate students. Both of them then were taken by their families
overseas to Muslim countries, and then they came back to the U.S. Barack
Obama, of course, went to Indonesia and came back with his mother.
Anwar al-Awlaki came back to go to—was sent back by his father from
Yemen to attend college at Colorado State.
And interestingly, this caused them both, I think it’s fair to say,
some confusion about identity, some sort of identity crisis, which Obama
has famously described in his book,
Dreams from My Father. And
Obama actually talks in that book about the temptation of radicalism,
of militancy, that he felt as a young man, as a young black man in
America, with this very colorful and sort of mixed-up background. Anwar
al-Awlaki clearly also, ultimately, felt the temptation of radicalism
and ended up taking, you know, a very different path from Barack Obama.
But it’s sort of fascinating. President Obama wouldn’t talk to me for
this book, but maybe after he’s out of office, I would love to sit down
with him and talk to him about how he sees all of this.
AMY GOODMAN: And what most surprised you in writing this book, in writing
Objective Troy?
SCOTT SHANE:
You know, I guess what struck me was—and I guess this is true of all of
our lives, but the sort of random twists and turns that have such a
profound effect on an individual life and sometimes on the course of
history. I think if that escort service manager had not called Anwar
al-Awlaki and sent him on the path that ended with al-Qaeda in Yemen, we
might be as tired of seeing Anwar al-Awlaki on
Meet the Press as some people are of seeing Senator McCain on
Meet the Press,
and he might be, you know, a sort of prominent American political voice
and perhaps a useful voice, given the events of the last 15 years. So,
you know, it just struck me in a way how contingent life is, how random
life is and how very small events can have profound outcomes.
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Shane, we want to thank you so much for being with us. Scott Shane is national security reporter for
The New York Times. Along with Jo Becker, he recently wrote a two-part series [
part one,
part two] in the
Times, "The Libya Gamble," but he’s also author of the brand new book,
Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone. The book just won the 2016 Lionel Gelber Prize. This is
Democracy Now! I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh. Thanks for joining us.