Ground All Drones is a committee of Women Against Military Madness (WAMM) created to address the use of drones, particularly armed drones. Drones are developed worldwide, not only by the U.S. but by other nations as well. In the U.S.unarmed surveillance drones could be used to spy on citizens, a clear violation of our Fourth Amendment Rights. The current focus of this committee is on the use of weaponized drones.
US drone strikes kill 28 unknown people for every intended target, new Reprieve report reveals
US
drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan have killed as many as 1,147
unknown people in failed attempts to kill 41 named individuals, a report
by human rights charity Reprieve has found.
The report looks at
deaths resulting from US drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan between
November 2002 and November 2014. It identifies 41 men who appeared to
have been killed multiple times – drawing into question the Obama
administration’s repeated claims that the covert drone programme is
‘precise.’
While the US drone programme is shrouded in secrecy,
security sources regularly brief the media on the names of those
suspected militants targeted or killed in the strikes. Frequently, those
individuals are reported to have been targeted or killed on multiple
occasions.
Reprieve’s assessment is the first to provide an
estimate of the number of people – including in some cases children –
who are killed each time the US apparently attempts to assassinate a
‘high value target.’ Due to the US Government’s refusal to publish any
information relating to the programme, or the ‘Kill List’ said to
determine its targets, the analysis is limited to existing,
publicly-available data from media reports and The Bureau of
Investigative Journalism.
Key findings of the report include:
In
Pakistan, 24 men were reported as killed or targeted multiple times.
Missed strikes on these men killed 874 people, including 142 children.
In
Yemen, 17 men were reported killed or targeted multiple times. Missile
strikes on these men killed 273 others and accounted for almost half of
all confirmed civilian casualties and 100% of all recorded child deaths.
In
targeting Ayman al Zawahiri, the CIA killed 76 children and 29 adults.
They failed twice, and Ayman al Zawahiri is reportedly still alive.
It
took the US six attempts to kill Qari Hussain, a Pakistani target.
During these attempts, 128 people were killed, including 13 children.
Each
assassination target on the US government’s so-called Kill List ‘died’
on average more than three times before their actual death.
The
US government’s drone programme has come under increasing scrutiny
after a number of strikes that hit large numbers of civilians by
mistake. It was recently revealed – as a result of investigations by
Reprieve – that the US government compensates civilian victims of drone
strikes in Yemen.
Jennifer Gibson, Staff Attorney at Reprieve who compiled the report, said:
“These ‘high value targets’ appear to be doing the impossible – dying
not once, not twice, but as many as six times. At the same time,
hundreds of unknown men, women and children are also caught in the
crosshairs. President Obama continues to insist drone strikes are
‘precise’, but when targeting one person instead kills as many as 128
others, there’s only one conclusion that can be drawn – there’s nothing
targeted about the US drone programme.”
Many changes and transformations are
occurring that introduce new challenges into military service and new
costs and consequences to those who serve.
Service in the US military is being reshaped into the profession of
arms. This means that fewer people are serving and more is being asked
of them. We know that their trauma is more severe due, among other
factors, to multiple deployments, the extent of civilian casualties and
the despair of unending global war. We must also awaken to the
technological changes in military practice and their impact foisted upon
those who serve.
Though stationed far behind the front lines, drone operators are
among those on the front lines of these changes. These are the women and
men who sit at electronic consoles stateside and operate unmanned
drones from safe havens in the United States to monitor, spy on, attack
and slay antagonists on the far side of the planet. They must sit at the
controls during their entire workday, perform difficult assessments and
technical operations, and when ordered, kill without being in danger
themselves. After all that, they go home to dinner. President Obama has
used drones extensively during his tenure. The Air Force refers to drone
operators as "21st century warriors."
Political public relations make much of the fact that these people
are not "in harm's way." No "boots on the ground," so they are
supposedly safe. But US drone operators are reported to have severe
difficulties in their service, are in deep pain and break down with
post-traumatic stress disorder to significant degrees. I can attest to
this from my direct therapeutic and educational work with our military
over the last several years. Though physically not in danger, they are
not safe and are in harm's way. The damage is to their psychological,
social, professional and spiritual well-being and to the well-being of
their families.
Why? There are numerous ways our creation and use of 21st century
warriors redefines the entire tradition of warriorhood and in fact
renders them more vulnerable to harm from the invisible wounds of war.
The traditional warrior's contract is to meet armed enemy combatants
in fair face-to-face battle. They agree to enter the kill-or-be-killed
situation. Modern combatants testify that though killing hurts, it hurts
the least and does the least long-term harm when it occurs in the
context of a fair fight. When the fight is unfair or unequal, when
civilians are caught in the crossfire, when extreme "collateral damage"
is caused to get the target, there is inevitably more trauma.
Drone operators are removed from this ultimate situation. They may
track their targets for months, know who they are, what their families
are like, how many children they have and where they work. They might be
ordered to strike and kill at any time, even when the family is
present, even with all the reported safeguards against causing civilian
deaths. These modern techno-warriors often know their targets who don't
know them, are charged with taking life at a long distance without their
own lives being in danger, and may be ordered to cause the deaths of
civilians with absolutely no choice in the matter.
What do veterans say about long distance killing and its impact on
them? Bill, a 19-year-old bombardier during World War II, asked for
therapy last year because he said, "I know I dropped my bombs on
civilian targets over Europe. I have felt like a mass murderer my entire
life. I want to find some peace before I meet my Maker and am sent to
hell for it." John, a forward artillery observer in Vietnam, said, "The
drone pilots are doing what I had to do. There is little difference in
me pulling the lanyard on my howitzer and killing people many miles away
and them killing from the other side of the world." And Don, gunner's
mate on a destroyer during the First Gulf War said, "Every time I
climbed into my gun turret I had to cross a line and be willing to kill
strangers I would never see scores of miles away."
These men suffered
invisible wounds from long distance killing and attest to its long-term
psychological impact on their adult lives.
Civilian casualty rates in World War I were 10 percent; in World War
II, 50 percent; by Vietnam, they were 70 percent - and in the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars, 90 percent. Long distance killing has increased
exponentially in the modern era due to advanced weapons technology. This
has changed the nature of warfare and the demands on warriors. These
changes will only increase the degree of invisible wounding even as it
protects the physical safety of the new warriors. We may have fewer
visible wounds, but we should expect significantly increased invisible
wounding as fewer and fewer 21st century warriors cause more death and
destruction without the warriors' concomitant threat. The kinds of
veterans we will have to honor, tend and heal will change. Not only will
the veterans be affected, but all of us who sent them, and whom they
notionally serve, will have to go home to dinner and find ways to live
with it.
This article was first published onTruthout and any reprint or
reproduction on any other website must acknowledge Truthout as the
original site of publication.
Read whole article on Truthout and see related articles.
Edward Tick, PhD, is the founding director of Soldier's Heart. He is the author of the award-winning War and the Soul, and his new book, Warrior's Return: Restoring the Soul After War (Sounds True, November 2014).
‘Drone strikes have been sold to the American public on the claim that
they’re ‘precise.’ But they are only as precise as the intelligence that
feeds them.' Photograph: Khaled Abdullah/Reuters
New analysis of data conducted by human rights group Reprieve shared
with the Guardian, raises questions about accuracy of intelligence
guiding ‘precise’ strikes.
The drones came for Ayman Zawahiri on 13 January 2006, hovering over a village in Pakistan called Damadola. Ten months later, they came again for the man who would become al-Qaida’s leader, this time in Bajaur.
Eight years later, Zawahiri is still alive. Seventy-six children and
29 adults, according to reports after the two strikes, are not.
However many Americans know who Zawahiri is, far fewer are familiar
with Qari Hussain. Hussain was a deputy commander of the Pakistani
Taliban, a militant group aligned with al-Qaida that trained the
would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad,
before his unsuccessful 2010 attack. The drones first came for Hussain
years before, on 29 January 2008. Then they came on 23 June 2009, 15
January 2010, 2 October 2010 and 7 October 2010.
Finally, on 15 October 2010, Hellfire missiles fired from a Predator or Reaper drone killed Hussain, the Pakistani Taliban later confirmed.
For the death of a man whom practically no American can name, the US
killed 128 people, 13 of them children, none of whom it meant to harm.
A new analysis of the data available to the public about drone
strikes, conducted by the human-rights group Reprieve, indicates that
even when operators target specific individuals – the most focused
effort of what Barack Obama calls “targeted killing” – they kill vastly
more people than their targets, often needing to strike multiple times.
Attempts to kill 41 men resulted in the deaths of an estimated 1,147
people, as of 24 November.
Reprieve, sifting through reports compiled by the Bureau of
Investigative Journalism, examined cases in which specific people were
targeted by drones multiple times. Their data, shared with the Guardian,
raises questions about the accuracy of US intelligence guiding strikes
that US officials describe using words like “clinical” and “precise.”
The analysis is a partial estimate of the damage wrought by Obama’s
favored weapon of war, a tool he and his administration describe as far
more precise than more familiar instruments of land or air power.
“Drone strikes have been sold to the American public on the claim
that they’re ‘precise’. But they are only as precise as the intelligence
that feeds them. There is nothing precise about intelligence that
results in the deaths of 28 unknown people, including women and
children, for every ‘bad guy’ the US goes after,” said Reprieve’s
Jennifer Gibson, who spearheaded the group’s study.
Some 24 men specifically targeted in Pakistan
resulted in the death of 874 people. All were reported in the press as
“killed” on multiple occasions, meaning that numerous strikes were aimed
at each of them. The vast majority of those strikes were unsuccessful.
An estimated 142 children were killed in the course of pursuing those 24
men, only six of whom died in the course of drone strikes that killed
their intended targets.
In Yemen,
17 named men were targeted multiple times. Strikes on them killed 273
people, at least seven of them children. At least four of the targets
are still alive.
Available data for the 41 men targeted for drone strikes across both
countries indicate that each of them was reported killed multiple times.
Seven of them are believed to still be alive. The status of another,
Haji Omar, is unknown. Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, whom drones targeted three
times, later died from natural causes, believed to be hepatitis.
The data cohort is only a fraction of those killed by US drones
overall. Reprieve did not focus on named targets struck only once.
Neither Reprieve nor the Guardian examined the subset of drone strikes
that do not target specific people: the so-called “signature strikes”
that attack people based on a pattern of behavior considered suspicious,
rather than intelligence tying their targets to terrorist activity. An
analytically conservative Council on Foreign Relations tally assesses
that 500 drone strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan have killed 3,674 people.
As well, the data is agnostic on the validity of the named targets
struck on multiple occasions being marked for death in the first place.
Like all weapons, drones will inevitably miss their targets given
enough chances. But the secrecy surrounding them obscures how often
misses occur and the reasons for them. Even for the 33 named targets
whom the drones eventually killed – successes, by the logic of the drone
strikes – another 947 people died in the process.
There are myriad problems with analyzing data from US drone strikes.
Those strikes occur under a blanket of official secrecy, which means
analysts must rely on local media reporting about their aftermath, with
all the attendant problems besetting journalism in dangerous or denied
places. Anonymous leaks to media organizations, typically citing an
unnamed American, Yemeni or Pakistani official, are the only
acknowledgements that the strikes actually occur, or target a particular
individual.
Without the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command
declassifying more information on the strikes, unofficial and imprecise
information is all that is available, complicating efforts to
independently verify or refute administration assurances about the
impact of the drones.
“The only people that we fire a drone at [sic] are confirmed
terrorist targets at the highest level after a great deal of vetting
that takes a long period of time. We don’t just fire a drone at somebody
and think they’re a terrorist,” the secretary of state, John Kerry, said at a BBC forum in 2013.
A Reprieve team investigating on the ground in Pakistan turned up
what it believes to be a confirmed case of mistaken identity. Someone
with the same name as a terror suspect on the Obama administration’s
“kill list” was killed on the third attempt by US drones. His brother
was captured, interrogated and encouraged to “tell the Americans what
they want to hear”: that they had in fact killed the right person.
Reprieve has withheld identifying details of the family in question,
making the story impossible to independently verify.
“President Obama needs to be straight with the American people about
the human cost of this programme. If even his government doesn’t know
who is filling the body bags every time a strike goes wrong, his claims
that this is a precise programme look like nonsense, and the risk that
it is in fact making us less safe looks all too real,” Gibson said.
CIA drones targeted but missed al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in this strike in 2006 (AFP/Getty)
As the number of US drone strikes in Pakistan hits 400, research by
the Bureau of Investigative
Journalism finds that fewer than 4% of the
people killed have been identified by available records as named members
of al Qaeda. This calls in to question US Secretary of State John
Kerry’s claim last year that only “confirmed terrorist targets at the highest level” were fired at.
The Bureau’s Naming the Dead
project has gathered the names and, where possible, the details of
people killed by CIA drones in Pakistan since June 2004. On October 11
an attack brought the total number of drone strikes in Pakistan up to
400.
The names of the dead have been collected over a year of research in
and outside Pakistan, using a multitude of sources. These include both
Pakistani government records leaked to the Bureau, and hundreds of open
source reports in English, Pashtun and Urdu.
Naming the Dead has also drawn on field investigations conducted by
the Bureau’s researchers in Pakistan and other organisations, including
Amnesty International, Reprieve and the Centre for Civilians in
Conflict.
Only 704 of the 2,379 dead have been identified, and only 295 of
these were reported to be members of some kind of armed group. Few
corroborating details were available for those who were just described
as militants. More than a third of them were not designated a rank, and
almost 30% are not even linked to a specific group. Only 84 are
identified as members of al Qaeda – less than 4% of the total number of
people killed.
These findings “demonstrate the continuing complete lack of
transparency surrounding US drone operations,” said Mustafa Qadri,
Pakistan researcher for Amnesty International.
Pakistan drone strike deaths in numbers
Total killed
2,379
Total named as militants
295
Total named as al Qaeda
84
Total named
704
When asked for a comment on the Bureau’s investigation, US National
Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said that strikes were only
carried out when there was “near-certainty” that no civilians would be
killed.
“The death of innocent civilians is something that the U.S.
Government seeks to avoid if at all possible. In those rare instances in
which it appears non-combatants may have been killed or injured,
after-action reviews have been conducted to determine why, and to ensure
that we are taking the most effective steps to minimise such risk to
non-combatants in the future,” said Hayden.
“Associated forces”
The Obama administration’s stated legal justification for such
strikes is based partly on the right to self-defence in response to an
imminent threat. This has proved controversial as leaked documents
show the US believes determining if a terrorist is an imminent threat
“does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a
specific attack on US persons and interests will take place in the
immediate future.”
The legal basis for the strikes also stems from the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force
(Aumf) – a law signed by Congress three days after the September 11
2001 terrorist attacks. It gives the president the right to use “all
necessary and appropriate force” against those behind the attacks on the
US, wherever they are.
The text of Aumf does not name any particular group. But the president, in a major foreign policy speech in May 2013, said this includes “al Qaeda, the Taliban and its associated forces”.
Nek Mohammed speaks at a Jirga three weeks before he died in a CIA drone strike (Reuters/Kamran Wazir)
It is not clear who is deemed to be “associated” with the Taliban.
Hayden told the Bureau that “an associated force is an organised armed
group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda and is a
co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners.”
The CIA itself does not seem to know the affiliation of everyone they
kill. Secret CIA documents recording the identity, rank and affiliation
of people targeted and killed in strikes between 2006 to 2008 and 2010
to 2011 were leaked to the McClatchy news agency in April 2013. They identified hundreds of those killed as simply Afghan or Pakistani fighters, or as “unknown”.
Determining the affiliation even of those deemed to be “Taliban” is
problematic. The movement has two branches: one, the Afghan Taliban, is
fighting US and allied forces, and trying to re-establish the ousted
Taliban government of Mullah Omar in Kabul. The other, the Pakistani
Taliban or the TTP, is mainly focused on toppling the Pakistani state,
putting an end to democracy and establishing a theocracy based on
extreme ideology. Although the US did not designate the TTP as a foreign terrorist organisation until September 2010, the group and its precursors are known to have worked with the Afghan Taliban.
According to media reports, the choice of targets has not always
reflected the priorities of the US alone. In April last year the McClatchy news agency
reported the US used its drones to kill militants in Pakistan’s tribal
areas in exchange for Pakistani help in targeting al Qaeda members.
Three days before the McClatchy report, the New York Times revealed the first known US drone strike in Pakistan, on June 17 2004,
was part of a secret deal with Pakistan to gain access to its airspace.
The CIA agreed to kill the target, Nek Mohammed, in exchange for
permission for its drones to go after the US’s enemies.
“Judging
by the sheer volume of strikes and the reliable estimates of total
casualties, it is very unlikely that the majority of victims are senior
commanders” Mustafa Qadri Amnesty International
The “butcher of Swat”
Senior militants have been killed in the CIA’s 10-year drone campaign
in Pakistan. But as the Bureau’s work indicates, it is far from clear
that they constitute the only or even the majority of people killed in
these strikes.
“Judging by the sheer volume of strikes and the reliable estimates of
total casualties, it is very unlikely that the majority of victims are
senior commanders,” says Amnesty’s Qadri.
The Bureau has only found 111 of those killed in Pakistan since 2004
described as a senior commander of any armed group – just 5% of the
total. Research by the New America Foundation estimated the proportion of senior commanders to be even lower, at just 2%.
Among them are men linked to serious crimes. Men such as Ibne Amin, known as the “butcher of Swat” for the barbaric treatment he and his men meted out on the residents of the Swat valley in 2008 and 2009.
Others include Abu Khabab al Masri, an al Qaeda chemical weapons expert. Drones also killed Hakimullah and Baitullah Mehsud, and Wali Ur Rehman – all senior leaders of the TTP.
There are 73 more people recorded in Naming the Dead who are
described as mid-ranking members of armed groups. However someone’s rank
is not necessarily a reliable guide to their importance in the
organisation.
“I think it really depends on what they are,” Rez Jan, a senior
Pakistan analyst at the American Enterprise Institute think tank told
the Bureau. “You can be a mid-level guy who is involved in [improvised
explosive device] production or training in bomb making or planting, or
combat techniques and have a fairly lethal impact in that manner.”
Rashid Rauf,
a British citizen killed in a November 2008 drone strike in Pakistan,
is one al Qaeda member who appears to have had an impact despite not
rising to the organisation’s highest echelons.
He acted as a point of contact between the perpetrators of the July 7
2005 attacks on the London Underground and their al Qaeda controllers.
He also filled a similar role linking al Qaeda central with the men
planning to bring down several airliners flying from London to the US in
the 2006 “liquid bomb plot”.
The Bureau has only been able to establish information about the
alleged roles of just 21 of those killed. Even this mostly consists of
basic descriptions such as “logistician” or “the equivalent of a colonel.”
Note: This story contains a clarification. 4% of people
who have been killed by CIA drone strikes have been named and
positively identified as members of al Qaeda by available records. Of
the drone strike victims who have been named, 12% are identified as al
Qaeda.
In Minneapolis, MN, USA, the WAMM-Ground All Drones Committee closed the week of counter-drone activities around the world with our "Fly Kites, Not Drones" event near the shores of Lake Harriet, one of the urban Chain of Lakes. WAMM-GAD provided small light-weight kites that children and their adults could decorate with symbols, words, "No Killer Drone" stickers, and colorful drawings. Our accessible activity drew some passersby, though it was a chilly autumn day. An unusual and, I think, important connection was made with three young adults (two women and one man) who are mechanical engineers from Iran, apparently attending graduate school at the University of Minnesota. They told us they were unaware of any opposition among Americans to drone warfare, and they were overjoyed to join our playful protest. We gave them copies of WAMM's current newsletter featuring a cover article written by a WAMM member who recently returned from a visit with her husband's family in Iran. In addition to signing postcards -- denouncing the US drone program -- to be sent to President Obama, the Iranian grad students flew kites and took many photos, which I'm hoping will be seen within Iran and around the world.